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THE SPIRIT OF NAGPRA: THE NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES
PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION ACT AND THE REGULATION
OF CULTURALLY UNIDENTIFIABLE REMAINS
AARON H. MIDLER*
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone tribel (Fallon Paiute) sought the
return of a nearly 10,000-year-old set of human remains known as the Spi-
rit Cave Man from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). 2 The BLM is
a federal agency that controlled the land upon which the remains were dis-
covered in 1940.3 The tribe argued that the Spirit Cave Man was a cultural
ancestor, and that federal law entitled them to the return, or in other words,
the repatriation, of his remains. 4
The BLM, which was responsible for determining whether the Spirit
Cave Man was an ancestor of the Fallon Paiute, found that no cultural affil-
iation existed between the remains and the claimant tribe.5 It found, none-
theless, that the Spirit Cave Man was Native American in origin.6 Under
then-current federal law, the BLM's determination allowed it to retain con-
trol of the Spirit Cave Man indefinitely.7 At that point, without new evi-
dence of cultural affiliation with the remains, the agency was under no
obligation to repatriate the Spirit Cave Man.8
The law governing the disposition of the Spirit Cave Man remains,
and all Native American remains, is the Native American Graves Protec-
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, May 2011; B.A. University of Chicago, 2006.
Many thanks to Jessica Bejerea and Professor Sarah K. Harding for their insightful aid. I would also
like to thank Esther Bowen and Reuben Midler for their patience and guidance throughout the writing
process.
1. The use of the word "tribe" in this Note, except where explicitly stated to the contrary, refers
to Federally-recognized Native American tribes.
2. Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 (D.
Nev. 2006).
3. Id
4. Id at 1209-10.
5. Id. at 1211.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1218.
8. Id
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tion and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). 9 NAGPRA is federal law aimed at
protecting Native American gravesites and human remains from desecra-
tion.10 It also provides a way for Native American tribes to recover ance-
stral remains from federally-funded museums, agencies, and institutions.1 '
The statute, however, does not provide a way for tribes to recover remains
from institutions that, like the Spirit Cave Man, are identified as Native
American but culturally unidentifiable with any presently existing, federal-
ly-recognized tribe.12
To fill that gap in the law, the Department of the Interior (DOI) issued
final regulations regarding the disposition of culturally unidentifiable Na-
tive American remains (CUNARs) on March 15, 2010 (March 2010 regula-
tions).13 While NAGPRA itself requires that Native American tribes prove
cultural affiliation to succeed in a claim for remains previously housed in
federally-funded institutions, these regulations allow tribes to claim CU-
NARs based on a geographic connection to the area where the remains
were discovered.14 The regulations, moreover, mandate the repatriation of
CUNARs in all cases where a claimant requests their return. 15
This mandate has divided public opinion. Some commentators see the
regulations as an illegitimate exercise of administrative power, arguing that
CUNARs are beyond the authority of the Secretary of the Interior (The
Secretary) to regulate.16 Others, in contrast, see the regulations as a legiti-
mate, and much needed, expansion of NAGPRA's repatriation goals.17
This Note examines the legitimacy of the March 2010 regulations.
Part I describes the common law and statutory protections for graves and
human remains, as well as the inability of Native Americans to avail them-
selves of these protections. Part II then focuses on the history, purpose, and
structure of NAGPRA as an answer to inadequate state and federal law
protections for Native American graves and human remains. It also ex-
plains the standard of cultural affiliation that institutions use to determine
9. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006).
10. Id
11. Id. §§ 3003, 3005.
12. See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
13. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations-Disposition of Cultu-
rally Unidentifiable Human Remains, 75 Fed. Reg. 12378, 12378 (Mar. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 10.11).
14. Id. at 12403-04.
15. See id. at 12382, 12403.
16. See, e.g., Letter from John W. McCarter, Jr., President and CEO, Field Museum of Natural
History, to Dr. Sherry Hutt, Manager, Nat'1 NAGPRA Program 1-3 (May 13, 2010),
www.regulations.gov (enter Keyword or ID: DOI-2007-0032-0177.1).
17. See, e.g., Letter from NAGPRA Review Comm. 1, 5 (May 14, 2010), www.regulations.gov
(enter Keyword or ID: DOI-2007-0032-0215.1).
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whether they will repatriate human remains to Native American tribes and
discusses the Kennewick Man' 8 dispute, which revolved around another set
of ancient human remains. Next, Part III revisits the Spirit Cave Man re-
mains, which are subject to the March 2010 regulations, in detail. Finally,
Part IV evaluates the legitimacy of the March 2010 regulations.
I. NATIVE AMERICANS AND AMERICAN LEGAL ATTITUDES TOWARD
GRAVES AND HUMAN REMAINS
A. The Issue ofLegal Standing and Civil Remedies for Desecration of
Graves and Bodies
In the United States, the availability of civil remedies for the desecra-
tion of a grave or corpse depends upon whether the litigant has legal stand-
ing to bring the claim. 19 Although American judges in the Eighteenth
Century imported the English notion that no one could acquire property
rights in corpses, this black letter rule proved unworkable. 20 The rule di-
vested plaintiffs of any legal remedy, even in extreme cases where the body
of a loved one had been mutilated or maimed. 21 In response, American
courts began to recognize a species of quasi property rights that gave the
next of kin a possessory interest in a corpse for the purposes of carrying out
a burial. 22 These rights also provided the next of kin with the necessary
legal standing to sue for the desecration of a corpse or grave.23
Today, the availability of civil remedies for the desecration of a corpse
or grave largely 24 depends upon whether a potential plaintiff can satisfy the
18. The Kennewick Man is an approximately 9,000-year-old set of skeletal remains. Its discovery
in Washington State in the 1990s sparked a conflict between the federal government, local tribes, and
scientists who wished to study the remains. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 868-69 (9th
Cir. 2004), amending, 357 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2004). Numerous authors have written about the discovery
of and subsequent legal battle over the Kennewick Man. See generally, e.g., DAVID HURST THOMAS,
SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN, ARCHAEOLOGY, AND THE BATrLE FOR NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY
(2000).
19. Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Liability for Desecration of Graves and Tombstones, 77
A.L.R.4th 108 §§ 2-3, 5 (1989); R. F. Martin, Annotation, Removal and Reinterment of Remains, 21
A.L.R.2d 472 § 6 (1952).
20. Martin, supra note 19.
21. See Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 239-40 (Minn. 1891) (recognizing that the wife of the
deceased had a property interest in her husband's corpse that allowed her to sue for emotional damages
over the unauthorized mutilation and dissection of the corpse).
22. See id. at 238-39; Martin, supra note 19.
23. See Veilleux, supra note 19; Martin, supra note 19.
24. One cause of action for the desecration of graves and corpses that does not necessarily depend
upon ties of kinship is based upon contract law. It allows individuals who purchase burial plots from a
cemetery to sue for desecration of the gravesite based upon a breach of contract. Veilleux, supra note
19, § 6. This theory of recovery, however, is irrelevant to the present discussion as most of the issues
regarding Native American burial sites do not revolve around traditional cemetery arrangements.
2011] 1333
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legal definition of "next of kin."25 The common law retains this concept
where statutory law has not spoken on the issue, and where it has spoken,
statutory law embraces the "next of kin" concept. 26 Although "next of kin"
has varied meanings, depending on the state, it generally refers to individu-
als who possess a marriage or blood relation to the interred corpse at is-
sue.27 Therefore, if an individual cannot demonstrate either of these
relationships, she cannot seek civil remedies for the desecration of either
the grave or the corpse. 28
As a result, Native American claimants have often been unable to use
these remedies to protect their gravesites and human remains. 29 Anglo-
American notions of family and kinship do not always translate easily to
Native American social practices.30 In United States v. Unknown Heirs, a
federal district court faced the choice of legitimizing one of two plural
wives of a dead Comanche chief for the purpose of directing internment of
the Chief's body.31 Choosing the Chief's legitimate wife would have pro-
vided legal standing to one set of family members over another.32 Rather
than make this choice, and declare illegitimate some of the Chief's child-
ren, the court itself determined a place of interment. 33 It chose Fort Sill in
Oklahoma, the spot where, decades earlier, the tribe had surrendered tribal
rule to the United States government. 34
Additionally, legal standing issues arise when Native Americans lack-
ing any blood or marriage connection to the deceased seek civil remedies
for grave desecration. 35 In the Medicine Bird case, the Tennessee Depart-
ment of Transportation dug up three ancient Native American graves while
25. See id. §§ 2-3, 5.
26. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ky.-Va. Stone Co., 149 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1941) (holding that "next
of kin" referred to those individuals who would inherit from the deceased via the statute of descent);
Dennis v. Keillor, 306 N.W.2d 324, 325-26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the son of the deceased
had standing to bring a lawsuit for the desecration of his parents' grave); Wainwright v. N.Y.C. Health
and Hosps. Corp., 877 N.Y.S.2d 201, 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (holding that relatives of the deceased
may bring an action for the mishandling of a corpse); Veilleux, supra note 19; Martin, supra note 19.
27. See 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 23 (2009).
28. See id; Veilleux, supra note 19; Martin, supra note 19.
29. Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing Competing
Legal Interests in Native American Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 437, 447-
48 (1986) (discussing the difficulties Native Americans face in acquiring civil and criminal protection
for their gravesites).
30. Steve Russell, Sacred Ground: Unmarked Graves Protection in Texas Law, 4 TEX. F. ON C.L.
& C.R. 3, 12 (1998).
31. United States v. Unknown Heirs, 152 F. Supp 452, 453-55 (W.D. Okla. 1957).
32. See id. at 455.
33. Id. at 456.
34. Id at 455-56.
35. Tennessee ex rel. Comm'r of Transp. v. Med. Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734,
742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
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widening a traffic intersection. 36 It then filed suit to relocate the graves and
terminate the use of the land as a cemetery under state law. 37 The trial court
initially allowed fifteen Native American defendants to oppose relocation
of the graves.38 On appeal, the court found that none of the Native Ameri-
can defendants had sufficient standing under Tennessee law to participate
in the lawsuit. 39 The relevant statute gave standing to individuals who had a
property interest in the land where the gravesite was located or were blood
relatives of the deceased.40 None of the Native American defendants satis-
fied these statutory requirements. 41 As a result, they were unable to partici-
pate in the suit to prevent relocation of the graves. 42
B. The Efficacy of Criminal Grave Protections for Native American
Graves
Native Americans have also faced challenges when turning to the
criminal law to protect their graves and human remains. Traditionally,
American law has protected the sanctity of graves. 43 Every state has
enacted laws to protect graves from vandalism and looting,44 and, general-
ly, no one may exhume a body except under compelling circumstances. 45
However, courts have not regularly enforced criminal anti-desecration laws
when applied to Native American burial sites.46
For example, in Newman v. State, a University of Miami student was
convicted under a statute designed to prevent the looting and desecration of
tombs and graves for removing the skull of a Seminole Indian from an
unmarked grave.47 The District Court of Appeal of Florida overturned the
judgment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of the required
malicious intent.48 The court cited Newman's good character and his forth-
36. Id. at 743.
37. Id.
38. Id at 744.
39. Id. at 757.
40. Id. at 756.
41. Id. at 757.
42. See id
43. Veilleux, supra note 19, § 2(a).
44. See Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 38-39 (1992).
45. Veilleux, supra note 19, § 2(a) (noting that while legal rules governing the burial and exhuma-
tion of corpses differ from state to state, they all share a common disinclination to move a body from its
resting place).
46. See Echo-Hawk, supra note 29, at 448.
47. Newman v. State, 174 So. 2d 479, 480-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
48. Id. at 484.
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right admission to taking the skull.49 Additionally, the court emphasized the
apparent desolation of the burial site in the wilderness and indicated that a
reasonable person would conclude that the site was not a burial ground.50
Nonetheless, commentators suggest that if Newman had taken the skull
from a conventional cemetery, then the court would have treated his theft
as involving malicious intent per se.51
Moreover, case law also reflects disparity between legal notions about
the nature of dead bodies and Native American cultural beliefs. In State v.
Glass, an Ohio appellate court reversed the grave robbing conviction of a
real estate developer.52 The court reversed the conviction because the re-
mains that she removed from her project site were 125 years old and no
longer recognizable bodies.53 According to the court, "[a]fter undergoing
an undefined degree of decomposition," the skeleton decomposes to a point
where "it ceases to be a dead body in the eyes of the law."54 This analysis
implies that, in the eyes of the law, once remains reach a certain age, they
lose a measure of the sacrosanct nature that requires society to enact grave
protections for them.5 5 Broadly speaking, Native Americans do not possess
the same attitude toward skeletal remains. 56 Rather, "[n]ative people main-
tain close religious connections with ancient dead," and see the continued
repose of the dead as integral to maintaining the identity and prosperity of
the tribe.57
C. The Applicability of Cemetery Laws to Native American Issues
Additionally, laws designed to establish and maintain cemeteries have
not provided a vehicle for addressing Native American concerns.58 In Wa-
na the Bear v. Community Construction, Inc., a housing developer unco-
vered a burial ground of the Miwok tribe and excavated over 200 human
49. Id. at 482.
50. Id. at 483.
51. Echo-Hawk, supra note 29, at 447; see Newman, 174 So. 2d at 483.
52. State v. Glass, 273 N.E.2d 893, 894, 898 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971).
53. See id. at 898.
54. Id.
55. For example, federal law takes the stance that remains that are over 100 years old and of
scientific interest are considered archaeological resources. 43 C.F.R. § 7.3(a) (2009).
56. See, e.g., James Riding In, Cal Seciwa, Suzan Shown Harjo & Walter Echo-Hawk, Protecting
Native American Human Remains, Burial Grounds, and Sacred Places: Panel Discussion, 19 WICAZO
SA REv. 169, 173 (2004) ("When we entered those places within the Smithsonian where the human
remains were kept, we saw row after row of shelves that reached almost to the ceiling. Just walking into
those areas gave me such an oppressive feeling. It was a feeling right here [points to chest].").
57. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 44, at 46.
58. Wana the Bear v. Comm. Constr., Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423, 424, 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
[Vol 86:31336
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remains. 59 In 1980, a descendant of the Miwok tribe sought to enjoin future
construction on the site based upon an 1872 statute that prohibited disin-
terment of bodies without force of law.60 A California state court deter-
mined that, in this case, the statute did not protect the burial grounds from
development. 61
The court could not apply the 1872 statute retroactively. 62 Only burial
grounds in use after enactment of the statute were eligible to receive pro-
tected status as cemeteries. 63 In 1872, the Miwoks no longer used the site
for burials, and no other groups conducted burials on the site thereafter.64
Thus, the 1872 statute did not apply to the Miwok burial grounds. 65
The court found no way to account for the fact that the Miwok tribe
left the area because they were forced out between 1850 and 1870.66 Al-
though the court noted that outside forces prevented the Miwok from using
the burial site after 1870, the court did not attempt to fashion a remedy
based on this fact.67 Consequently, the gravesite went unprotected. 68
As the above cases indicate, Native Americans have faced challenges
when seeking a legal remedy for the desecration of a grave or body using
state law. Unknown Heirs and Medicine Bird show that the legal concept of
next of kin is somewhat incompatible with Native American social practic-
es. Because Native American claimants often have no blood or marriage
ties to the deceased, they cannot employ existing civil remedies to combat
grave desecration. Additionally, as the Newman case shows, courts do not
always apply criminal law prohibitions on the desecration of graves to pro-
tect Native American burial sites. Moreover, the Glass case tells us that
criminal law prohibitions on grave robbing will not protect ancient Native
American remains. Lastly, state laws that govern the creation and mainten-
ance of cemeteries have also provided little aid to Native Americans seek-
ing protection for their gravesites. Wana the Bear shows that these laws are
ill-suited to crafting remedies when dealing with issues such as the forced
migration of a Native American tribe away from its burial grounds.
59. Id. at 424.
60. Id at 425.
61. Id. at 426-27.
62. Id. at 424-25.
63. Id. at 425.
64. Id. at 426.
65. Id. at 426-27.
66. See id. at 426.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 426-27.
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D. Federal Law and Policy Regarding Native American Graves and Hu-
man Remains
Native Americans, furthermore, have not fared better under federal
law and policy regarding gravesites and human remain. Early federal policy
regarding Native American remains was exploitive. In 1867, the Army
Surgeon General ordered field surgeons to collect any available remains of
Native Americans and have them sent to the Surgeon General for scientific
study and display in an Army museum.69 Field surgeons collected at least
four thousand Native American remains under this policy. 70
Moreover, early federal legislation treated Native Americans remains
as cultural resources. The Antiquities Act of 1906 does not provide any
rights to Native Americans to human remains or cultural objects. 71 Instead,
it presumes control over all Native American burial sites and vests owner-
ship of all excavated remains and cultural items in the United States. 72 The
Act broadly covers all "objects of historic or scientific interest" discovered
on federal land and provides for their excavation to benefit the public. 73 It
makes no mention of seeking Native American approval, control, or con-
sultation for the excavation of gravesites found there.74
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA), which
replaced the Antiquities Act, also treats Native American remains as re-
sources to be disposed of by the United States. 75 Although it states that
objects found "on public lands and Indian lands" are an "irreplaceable part
of the Nation's heritage," the Act is not intended as a remedial measure for
Native Americans, nor does it treat human remains as categorically differ-
ent from any other cultural artifact. 76 Rather, its purpose is to "[protect]
archaeological resources and sites which are on public lands and Indian
lands, and to foster increased cooperation and exchange of information
between governmental authorities, the professional archaeological commu-
nity, and private individuals."77 ARPA provides Native Americans with the
authority to grant or refuse a permit to excavate on their tribal lands and to
govern the disposition of artifacts and other cultural items found on those
69. National Museum of the American Indian Act § 2, 20 U.S.C. § 80q (2006).
70. Id
71. See Antiquities Act of 1906 §§ 1-6, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2006).
72. See id.; Echo-Hawk, supra note 29, at 448-49.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 432; see Echo-Hawk, supra note 29, at 448-49.
74. See 16 U.S.C. § 432; Echo-Hawk, supra note 29, at 448-49.
75. See Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 §§ 2-14, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa-mm
(2006); Echo-Hawk, supra note 29, at 449.
76. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(a)(1).
77. Id.
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lands, but it does not provide the means for tribes to claim cultural artifacts
or human remains found on federal land.78 Moreover, ARPA provides no
measures for repatriation, makes Native American opinion purely advisory
on non-tribal lands, and categorizes Native American remains of sufficient
antiquity as "archaeological resources." 79
The first federal legislation to recognize Native American remains as
human remains is the National Museum of the American Indian Act
(NMAIA), enacted in 1989.80 This law created the National Museum of the
American Indian as part of the Smithsonian Institution and transferred the
Heye Museum of New York's collection of Native American artifacts to
the Smithsonian. 81 Rather than being subsumed within a larger idea of arc-
haeological or cultural resources, the NMAIA specifically talks in terms of
human remains, 82 and the Congressional findings in the preamble disclose
a candid history of the mistreatment of Native American remains, including
the existence of at least 14,000 remains in the Smithsonian's holdings.83
In recognition of these facts, the NMAIA provides some remedial
avenues for Native Americans asking the Smithsonian to return the remains
of their ancestors. First, the statute provides that the Smithsonian inventory
its holdings in cooperation with Native American tribes, giving them a
complete picture of all the Native American remains in its possession. 84
Second, the NMAIA provides that, upon request, the Smithsonian must
repatriate any remains and artifacts identified with a federally recognized
tribe. 85 Third, the statute creates a committee to oversee the inventory and
repatriation process, composed partially of Native American representa-
tives.86 This provision allows Native Americans some ability to ensure the
Smithsonian's compliance with the law.
The NMAIA, nevertheless, is not broadly remedial. The purpose of
the Act is stated as being to "advance the study of Native Americans," to
"collect, preserve, and exhibit Native American objects" and to provide for
"Native American research and study" programs, rather than to correct past
78. Id. §§ 470cc(g)(2), 470dd(2).
79. Id. §§ 470aa, 470bb(l), 470cc(c).
80. See National Museum of the American Indian Act § 2, 20 U.S.C. § 80q (2006) (referring to
human remains not as archaeological resources but as part of Native American heritage).
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id.
84. Id. § 80q-9(a).
85. Id § 80q-9(c).
86. Id § 80q-10.
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wrongs.87 The NMAIA, moreover, only applies to the Smithsonian, leaving
other institutional collections of Native American remains unaffected.88
Indeed, the vast majority of Native American remains housed in insti-
tutional collections are outside the scope of the NMAIA. Federally-funded
institutions, excluding the Smithsonian, housed about 163,000 Native
American remains before NAGPRA's passage in 1990.89 Since that time,
institutions have repatriated approximately 38,671 of those remains. 90 The
124,329 human remains still housed in museum collections, all culturally
unidentifiable, await repatriation under the March 2010 regulations. 91
II. THE NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION
ACT
A. The Purpose and Scope ofNAGPRA
Congress enacted NAGPRA on November 16, 1990, to remedy inade-
quacies in state law dealing with the protection of Native American re-
mains and cultural objects, expand the scope of repatriation started by the
NMAIA, and right past wrongs against Native Americans. 92 Congress in-
tended NAGPRA to "protect Native American burial sites and the removal
of human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural
patrimony on federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands." 93 Commentators
have referred to it as human rights legislation, 94 and Representative Morris
Udall of Arizona, who introduced the bill to the House of Representatives,
characterized it as being about "respecting the rights of the dead." 95 He also
called it "the biggest thing we may have ever done" in the "scope of con-
science." 96
87. Id. § 80q-1.
88. See id. § 80q-9.
89. See NAT'L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL NAGPRA PROGRAM FY09
FINAL REPORT 10 (2009), http://www.nps.gov/nagpra/DOCUMENTS/FY09FinalReport.pdf (docu-
menting the 38,671 notices of inventory completion published in the Federal Register since 1990);
Letter from NAGPRA Review Committee, supra note 17, at I (noting that nearly 125,000 culturally
unidentifiable Native American remains have yet to be repatriated).
90. See NAT'L PARK SERV., supra note 89.
91. See Letter from NAGPRA Review Committee, supra note 17, at 1.
92. See S. REP. No. 101-473, at 1-2 (1990).
93. H.R.REP.No. 101-877,at8(1990).
94. See, e.g., Sarah Harding, Bonnichsen v. United States: Time, Place, and the Search for Identi-
ty, 12 INT'L. J. CULT. PROP. 249, 254 (2005).
95. 136 CONG. REC. E3484-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (remarks by Rep. Morris K. Udall).
96. Id.
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NAGPRA governs the disposition of Native American remains in
three sets of circumstances. 97 First, it governs remains discovered inciden-
tally or pursuant to an archaeological dig on either federal lands or tribal
lands after NAGPRA's enactment. 98 Second, NAGPRA requires federal
institutions and institutions that receive federal money to inventory their
collections of Native American remains and repatriate culturally affiliated
remains upon request of interested tribes. 99 Third, NAGPRA criminalizes
the knowing sale or purchase of Native American remains and cultural
objects by anyone who lacks the right of possession to those remains and
objects as defined by NAGPRA. 00
NAGPRA accomplishes its goals by balancing Native American
claims for repatriation against scientific interests. However, this balance
strongly favors the interests of Native American claimants. For example, in
the case of Native American remains found on federal or tribal land after
NAGPRA's enactment, the interests of a lineal descendant take precedence
over all others.' 0 ' Where no descendant is available, the statute favors a
number of tribal interests, including those of the tribe that owns the land
upon which the remains were found, as well as the tribe with the strongest
cultural affiliation to the remains. 102 NAGPRA only gives explicit recogni-
tion to the interests of museums and researchers when remains and objects
go unclaimed by any tribe. 103 At that point, members of the scientific
community may propose what to do with the remains. 104
Yet, NAGPRA does not allow scientists to make that decision unilate-
rally. Rather, they are required to discuss the fate of the remains with inter-
ested Native American groups, as well as the NAGPRA Review
Committee, a seven member advisory panel created by NAGPRA to re-
solve ownership disputes informally and advise the Secretary of the Interior
in drafting regulations to implement the statute. 105
Additionally, NAGPRA strongly favors the interests of Native Ameri-
can tribes seeking the repatriation of human remains housed in institutional
collections. First, without proof of consent by the "official governing body"
of a Native American tribe or the next of kin, museums may never acquire
97. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act § 4, 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2006); Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act §§ 3, 5, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3002, 3003 (2006).
98. 25 U.S.C. § 3002.
99. Id § 3003, 3005.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1170.
101. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(1).
102. Id. § 3002(a)(2).
103. Id. § 3002(b).
104. Id
105. Id
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a right of possession1 06 over Native American remains.10 7 Second, the
process of identifying the cultural affiliation of remains does not allow
institutions to conduct new scientific studies on Native American remains
and cultural objects. 08 Rather, NAGPRA requires institutions to make
cultural affiliation determinations "to the extent possible based on informa-
tion possessed by such museum or Federal agency." 109 Nor can vague
claims of scientific importance overpower the wishes of tribes rightfully
claiming remains and objects; only a specific, ongoing scientific study "of
major benefit to the United States" will stall the repatriation process long
enough to allow completion of the study.110 Third, short of an ongoing
scientific study, an institution must grant the repatriation request of tribes
that show cultural affiliation to human remains; the matter is not discretio-
nary.11'
When looked at collectively, these provisions show that NAGPRA
prioritizes Native American concerns about Native American remains over
scientific considerations.11 2 For remains found on federal or tribal land
after the enactment of the statute, NAGPRA favors a variety of tribal inter-
ests, giving scientists the opportunity to claim the remains only if no tribe
wishes to claim them at all.11 3 Moreover, for remains currently housed in
institutional collections, NAGPRA mandates that institutions must return
all culturally affiliated remains to a claimant tribe, giving scientists only a
limited opportunity to retain the remains for an ongoing scientific study. 114
B. The Cultural Affiliation Standard Established by NAGPRA
Cultural affiliation is the repatriation standard for human remains
housedl"5 in institutional collections.116 If an institution can determine or a
106. A right of possession is defined as "possession obtained with the voluntary consent of an
individual or group that had authority of alienation." Id. § 3001(13).
107. Id
108. Id. § 3003(b)(2).
109. Id. § 3003(a).
110. Id. § 3005(b) (allowing ninety days for the completion of an ongoing scientific study of "ma-
jor benefit" to the United States).
I 11. Id.
112. See id §§ 3002, 3003, 3005.
113. Id. §§ 3002(a)(l)-(2).
114. Id. §§ 3005(b)-(c).
115. As opposed to § 3002(a)(2)(C), for example, which applies to CUNARs discovered on tribal
land or land determined to be aboriginal by the Indian Claims Commission or the United States Court of
Claims. Id. § 3002(a)(2)(C). Section 3002(a)(2)(C) employs a geographic standard, repatriating remains
to tribes with connections to the locations where the remains were discovered. Id.
116. Id. § 3003(d). This standard may also apply to culturally unidentifiable remains discovered
after NAGPRA's enactment on federal land that was the aboriginal land of a Native American tribe as
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Native American tribe can prove cultural affiliation, then the institution
must repatriate the remains to the appropriate tribe. Cultural affiliation
means that "there is a relationship of shared group identityl" 7 which can be
reasonably traced historically or prehistorically between a present day In-
dian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier
group."1 18 One determines cultural affiliation by a "preponderance of the
evidence based upon geographical, kinship, biological, archaeological,
anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral traditional, historical, or other
relevant information or expert opinion."ll 9
Cultural affiliation, however, need not be proved with scientific cer-
tainty.120 Rather, NAGPRA requires a "reasonable" connection based on a
preponderance of the evidence.121 In passing NAGPRA, Congress recog-
nized that "it may be extremely difficult, unfair or even impossible in many
instances for claimants to show an absolute continuity from present day
Indian tribes to older, prehistoric remains without some reasonable gaps in
the historic or prehistoric record." 22 Therefore, claims "should not be prec-
luded solely because of gaps in the record" preventing the establishment of
scientific certainty.123
In the case of CUNARs, the statute itself provides little guidance.
NAGPRA does not address what should happen to remains when no deter-
mination of cultural affiliation is possible.124 The statute, instead, charges
the NAGPRA Review Committee with recommending a process for the
disposition of CUNARs housed in institutional collections, leaving the
question open-ended.125
C. The Kennewick Man and Native American Identity
The dispute over the Kennewick Man remains illustrates the types of
challenges faced by tribes, museums, and courts when applying a legal
standard, such as NAGPRA's standard of cultural affiliation, to the realities
determined by final judgment of the Indian Claims Commission or the United States Court of Claims.
Id. § 3002(a)(2)(C).
117. The term "shared group identity" remains undefined by NAGPRA or its implementing regula-
tions making the concept of cultural affiliation inherently vague. Id. § 3001(2).
118. Id.
119. Id. § 3005(a)(4).
120. 43 C.F.R. § 10.14(f) (2009).
121. 25 U.S.C. § 3003(d)(2)(C); see 43 C.F.R. § 10.14(d).
122. S. REP. No 101-473, at 9 (1990).
123. Id.
124. See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1218 (D.
Nev. 2006).
125. 25 U.S.C. § 3006(c)(5).
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of ethnic and cultural identity. In this case, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted the definition of "Native American"
under NAGPRA to formulate a legal test for determining whether remains
are Native American under the statute. 126 According to the court, human
remains are Native American in origin if they possess a cultural or genetic
relationship to a presently existing tribe, people, or culture.127 In terms of
proof, this relationship must go "beyond features common to all humani-
ty."l 28
When the Ninth Circuit applied this test to the Kennewick Man re-
mains, it arguably analyzed the relationship between the remains and the
claimant tribes in a way that led the court to determine whether the remains
were culturally affiliated to the claimant tribes, not whether the remains
were Native American in general, as it aimed to do.129 Moreover, the court
based its analysis upon questionable assumptions about Native American
identity.130 These apparent missteps illustrate the difficulty of applying a
legally-formulated test of cultural and ethnic identity to human remains.
The Kennewick Man is an approximately 9,000-year-old set of skelet-
al remains found on federal land in Washington State in 1996.131 The re-
mains are the most complete set dating from this time period in North
America.132 Scientists have called it an extremely important find to the
study of human origins in the Americas. 133
The Kennewick Man quickly became the center of controversy be-
tween scientists and Native claimants. Not long after the remains were
discovered, a confederation of tribes in the area requested repatriation of
the remains under NAGPRA.1 34 A group of scientists subsequently brought
suit in federal court to enjoin the DOI from repatriating the remains. The
scientist plaintiffs argued that the Kennewick Man was not Native Ameri-
can under NAGPRA, making the repatriation request invalid.135 In 2002,
the district court ruled in favor of the scientists, holding that the agency had
126. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 877 (9th Cir. 2004), amending, 357 F.3d 962 (9th
Cir. 2004).
127. Id. at 876.
128. Id at 877.
129. But see id. at 880.
130. The text accompanying notes 148-160 discusses this issue in detail..
131. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 868-69.
132. Id. at 869-70 n.6.
133. Id. at 869.
134. Id. at 870.
135. Id. at 870-71.
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relied on insufficient evidence in determining the Kennewick Man to be
Native American.136
Two years later, in Bonnichsen v. United States, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's determination.137 Crucial to the Bonnichsen
court's decision was its interpretation of the definition of "Native Ameri-
can" in NAGPRA. The statute provides that Native American "means of, or
relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United
States."138 Based on the use of the present tense in the definition, the court
inferred that Congress meant NAGPRA to apply only to cultural objects
and human remains bearing some cultural connection to a currently exist-
ing tribe.139 This analysis foreclosed the possibility that the Kennewick
Man could be Native American based on a connection to a tribe that pre-
viously but no longer existed in North America.140
To evaluate whether the DOI had met its evidentiary burden for de-
termining the Kennewick Man to be Native American, the Bonnichsen
court articulated the aforementioned legal test.141 NAGPRA itself provides
no legal procedure for determining whether remains are Native Ameri-
can.142
The court's test closely mirrors NAGPRA's cultural affiliation stan-
dard. Just as the Bonnichsen test looks for evidence of a genetic or cultural
connection between human remains and claimant tribes to establish Native
American identity, NAGPRA requires evidence of cultural affiliation based
upon "geographical, kinship, biological, archaeological, anthropological,
linguistic, folkloric, oral traditional, historical, or other relevant informa-
tion or expert opinion."l 43
Using this test, the Bonnichsen court rejected the DOI's determination
that the Kennewick Man was Native American. The DOI determined the
Kennewick Man to be Native American using the oral history of the tribes,
which claimed habitation of the area for at least 10,000 years.144 The court
held that oral historyl 45 alone was not substantial evidencel 46 of a cultural
136. Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1137-39 (D. Or. 2002), aff'd, 367 F.3d
864 (9th Cir. 2004).
137. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 865, 882.
138. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9) (2006).
139. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 875.
140. See id at 875-76.
141. Id at 880.
142. Id at 877-79.
143. 25 U.S.C. at § 3005(a)(4); see Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 876-77.
144. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 881-82.
145. Scientific experts for the government stated that they could neither confirm nor disconfirm the
possibility that the Kennewick Man was both Native American and culturally affiliated to the tribes of
the Columbia Plateau, due to the limited amount known about the inhabitants of North America nearly
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or genetic connection between modem day tribes in the area and the Ken-
newick Man. 147
Nonetheless, the Bonnichsen court's legal conclusion is itself ques-
tionable. The Bonnichsen test asks whether a cultural or genetic relation-
ship exists between a set of human remains and "a presently existing
tribe."1 48 A court, therefore, should require a comprehensive comparison of
the remains against all presently existing Native American tribes when
determining if such a relationship exists. If a court compares the remains to
the claimant tribes alone, then it has merely determined whether the re-
mains are culturally affiliated with those specific groups, rather than deter-
mining whether the remains are Native American generally. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the Kennewick Man lacks cultural affiliation
with any of the claimant tribes, not whether the remains are Native Ameri-
can in origin.149 The court stated that "[n]o cognizable link exists between
Kennewick Man and modem Columbia Plateau Indians."150 It did not dis-
cuss how the remains might relate genetically or culturally to the broader
community of Native Americans outside of the Columbia Plateau.151 In
short, the Ninth Circuit merely tested for cultural affiliation to the claimant
tribes, instead of determining whether the Kennewick Man was Native
American in origin. Consequently, the court may have wrongly determined
that the Kennewick Man fell outside of the scope of NAGPRA.
The court based its analysis on the assumption that a fixed racial com-
ponent of Native American identity exists. 152 Throughout its opinion, the
Bonnichsen court referenced the discrepancy between the Kennewick
10,000 years ago. Id at 880-81. In fact, researchers cannot presently provide a clear answer as to when
humanity first peopled North America. In the past, researchers have proposed dates as far back as
30,000 years. Stefan Lovgren, Americas Settled 15,000 Years Ago, Study Says, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
(Mar. 13, 2008), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/pf/62066933.html. Like the oral history that
the Bonnichsen court rejected in evaluating The Secretary's determination, scientific theory regarding
early North American habitation is in flux. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 881.
146. Specifically, the court asked whether the DOI had relied upon substantial evidence in deter-
mining the Kennewick Man to be Native American. Id at 880. If an agency does not rely upon substan-
tial evidence in making a decision, the Administrative Procedure Act empowers courts to overturn the
decision. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006). Substantial evidence means
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Bon-
nichsen, 367 F.3d at 880 n.19.
147. Id. at 882.
148. Id. at 879.
149. But see id. at 880.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 880-81.
152. The court emphasized that the Kennewick Man's cranial structure is significantly different
from contemporary Native American at three different points: in relating the discovery of the Kenne-
wick Man, in recounting the scientific analysis of the Kennewick Man, and in analyzing whether the
DOI had determined the Kennewick Man to be Native American based on substantial evidence. See id.
at 870, 871, 880.
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Man's cranial structure and the cranial structure of modem Native Ameri-
cans. 153 The court interpreted this discrepancy to suggest that no genetic
connection existed between the Kennewick Man and the claimant tribes,
even absent actual genetic evidence. 154
Yet, the discrepancy between the cranial structure of the Kennewick
Man and the claimant tribes does not prove the absence of a genetic con-
nection between them. 155 It is not clear that researchers, experts in the field,
would give significant weight to differing cranial structure. 156 Scientists
who worked on the Spirit Cave Man, a set of remains comparable in age to
the Kennewick Man, have asserted that it is unlikely that any individual
alive 10,000 years ago would bear a strong physiological resemblance to
what we would recognize as the ethnic groups of today.157 That is to say,
no group's 10,000-year-old ancestors are likely to look like their descen-
dants, and cranial dissimilarity proves nothing.158 Native American tribes
today are often composed of individuals with mixed ethnic backgrounds.1 59
As a result, differences might exist between the cranial structures and ge-
netic characters of ancient Native Americans and modem groups, even
where a genetic connection is present.160
These criticisms highlight the difficulty of applying a legal standard to
ethnic and cultural identity. First, useful evidence, such as a genetic sam-
ple, is often not available to prove or disprove a connection between human
remains and a claimant tribe. Second, what it means to be a part of a cultur-
al or ethnic group is open to debate. For example, expert scientists in the
Kennewick Man dispute asserted that the tribes of the Columbia Plateau
did not exist 9,000 years ago.161 In contrast, the tribes themselves asserted
that they had existed in the area since the beginning of time itself.162
Should one claim be better than the other based on the existence or absence
of scientific fact to prove it? Or should we evaluate these claims different-
ly, valuing the assertions of a Native American tribe about its own identity
over the scientific community's assertions about it? Although we are free to
153. See id. at 869, 871, 880.
154. See id
155. See Heather J. H. Edgar, Edward A. Jolie, Joseph F. Powell & Joe E. Watkins, Contextual
Issues in Paleoindian Repatriation: Spirit Cave Man as a Case Study, 7 J. Soc. ARCHAEOLOGY 101,
106-07 (2007).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Kimberly Tallbear, DNA, Blood, and Racializing the Tribe, 18 WICAZO SA REv. 81, 83,
89, 95, 98 (2003).
160. See Edgar, supra note 155, at 106-07.
161. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 881.
162. See Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
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choose what we value most, scientific fact or cultural belief, neither choice
will lead to an objective understanding of what it means to be "Native
American." 63 In fact, an entirely objective understanding of Native Amer-
ican cultural and ethnic identity is impossible; its meaning depends upon
who seeks to define it.164 Defining ethnic identity in a way that is both
sufficiently descriptive of its subject and equitable to all parties involved
presents a significant challenge for lawmakers and judges.
What is clear is that the Bonnichsen decision remains unaffected by
the March 2010 Regulations regarding culturally unidentifiable remains.
First, the regulations apply to remains already housed in institutional col-
lections, not remains discovered after the enactment of NAGPRA, such as
the Kennewick Man.165
Second, even if an institution had previously housed the Kennewick
Man in its collection, the March 2010 Regulations would not apply to his
remains; the regulations only apply to remains previously determined to be
Native American. 166 Because the Kennewick Man was determined not to
be Native American, the March 2010 Regulations would have no effect on
the ownership of his remains. This is true of any culturally unidentifiable
remains that are not determined to be Native American in origin.167
The Bonnichsen decision may, nonetheless, have an effect on other
remains that do fall within the scope of the March 2010 regulations. The
regulations require transfer of control over CUNARs to claimant tribes
based on the following priority: first, to the claimant tribe "from whose
tribal land, at the time of the excavation or removal, the human remains
were removed;" and second, to the claimant tribe "recognized as aboriginal
to the area from which the human remains were removed." 68 Given this
mandate to transfer control over all claimed CUNARs, opponents of repatr-
iation may look to the Bonnichsen analysis as a means to re-categorize
remains with scientific value from "Native American" to "Non-Native
163. See Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d. 575, 579-80 (1st. Cir 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 866 (1979) (noting that, according to the jury at the district court level, the Mashpee tribe had
voluntarily abandoned their tribal identity in the 1870s when the town of Mashpee became incorporated
by the state of Massachusetts); JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-
CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART 303 (1988) (arguing that the Mashpee did not neces-
sarily assimilate in the Eighteenth or Nineteenth Centuries but, as a matter of survival, found ways to
incorporate and adapt to the larger culture around them without giving up their sense of independent
identity).
164. See CLIFFORD, supra note 163, at 303.
165. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations-Disposition of Cultu-
rally Unidentifiable Human Remains, 75 Fed. Reg. 12378, 12403 (Mar. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 10.11).
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 12404.
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American," thus circumventing the repatriation mandate of the March 2010
Regulations.
III. THE SPIRIT CAVE MAN CONTROVERSY
In contrast to the anthropological conundrums presented above, the
Spirit Cave Man dispute raises questions about what constitutes appropriate
administrative action during the process for determining cultural affiliation.
In determining the Spirit Cave Man's cultural status, the BLM provided no
explanation as to why the Fallon Paiute tribe's evidence of cultural affilia-
tion was insufficient to prove a connection between them and the re-
mains. 169 In addition, as a United States district court suggested in
reviewing the BLM's determination, the agency impeded the Fallon Paiute
in presenting their complete case for cultural affiliation and violated
NAGPRA's moratorium on scientific study of Native American remains in
institutional collections.170 In short, the BLM exercised its administrative
power over the cultural affiliation determination of the Spirit Cave Man at
the expense of the Fallon Paiute.
In 1994, researchers at the Nevada State Museum rediscovered the
remains of the Spirit Cave Man, where they had languished in obscurity for
over fifty years. Originally, archaeologists discovered the remains in 1940
in Spirit Cave, on land owned then, and now, by the BLM.171 Subsequent-
ly, researchers dated the remains at nearly 10,000 years old.172 News of this
dating sparked considerable scientific and national interest in Spirit Cave
Man. 173
In 1997, the Fallon Paiute requested repatriation of the remains. 174 In
1996, the Nevada State Museum had determined that the remains lacked
cultural affiliation with any tribe, including the Fallon Paiute. 175 The BLM,
however, never formalized this determination, and the question of affilia-
tion officially remained unresolved.176 In the interim, researchers continued
to study the remains. 177 In 1998, the tribe appealed to the NAGPRA Re-
169. See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1224-25
(D. Nev. 2006).
170. See id.; MAKAH INDIAN TRIBE & THE NAT'L ASS'N OF TRIBAL HISTORIC PRES. OFFICERS,
FEDERAL AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES PROTECTION AND
REPATRIATION ACT G-50 (2008).
171. See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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view Committee to resolve the dispute.178 But because the BLM had yet to
make an official determination of cultural affiliation, the Committee de-
clined to involve itself.179
In 1999, the tribe presented scientific evidence of cultural affiliation
with the Spirit Cave Man to the BLM.180 By that point, the BLM, as well
as the state museum that housed Spirit Cave Man, agreed with the tribe that
the Spirit Cave Man was Native American in origin.' 8 The agency, none-
theless, stated that it would need more time to make a final determination
in light of the tribe's evidence. 182
Finally, in August 2000, four years after the Fallon Paiute requested
repatriation, the BLM officially determined the remains to be culturally
unidentifiable but Native American.183 The BLM would not repatriate the
Spirit Cave Man.184 The tribe again took the matter before the NAGPRA
Review Committee, which stated that it believed the BLM had failed to
take into account all of the tribe's evidence, and that the Spirit Cave Man
was culturally affiliated with the Fallon Paiute. 8 5 This apparent victory did
not ultimately benefit the Fallon Paiute; the advisory opinion was not bind-
ing on the BLM.186
Ignoring the committee opinion, the BLM affirmed its determination
of the Spirit Cave Man, and the tribe filed suit four years later.187 The Fed-
eral District Court of Nevada, in reviewing the issue under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA),1 88 found the BLM's determination to be
arbitrary and capricious, based on the fact that the agency ignored the
NAGPRA Review Committee's findings 89 and on the fact that it had re-
fused to explain why the tribe's evidence was insufficient.190
178. Id. at 1211.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id at 1212.
186. See 43 C.F.R. § 10.16(b) (2009).
187. Fallon Paiute-Shoshone, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
188. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is a comprehensive federal law governing federal
agencies. The APA provides standards for agencies to follow when promulgating and finalizing regula-
tions. It also determines when agency action is ripe for judicial review and provides legal standards for
courts to apply in those circumstances. TOM C. CLARK, Arr'Y GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947).
189. Although the Committee's final decisions are not binding upon anyone, the court reasoned that
the BLM was legally obligated to at least reconsider the evidence before it in light of the Committee
findings. Fallon Paiute-Shoshone, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
190. Id. at 1223-24.
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In its opinion, the court suggested that the BLM had purposefully ob-
structed the determination process. The court noted that the BLM provided
"no overarching determination . .. which explains the reasons for its ac-
tions and determinations."'91 And the court further chided the BLM by
reminding it that it "[is not] free to ignore other competing views by failing
to recognize their existence and refusing to describe the reasons why they
were not accepted." 192
Nonetheless, this decision did not represent a complete victory for the
Fallon Paiute. The tribe had alleged that the BLM violated NAGPRA by
forcing the tribe to present its evidence within forty-five days of the Spirit
Cave Man determination. 193 In contrast, the BLM studied the remains for
several years before making its final determination. 194 The court refused to
touch this issue, noting that agencies have considerable power to determine
their own internal procedures.195 Rather, the court based its decision entire-
ly upon the APA and the BLM's refusal to acknowledge the NAGPRA
Review Committee's findings.196 The question of whether the BLM had
improperly exercised its authority under NAGPRA went unanswered. 197
A related question regarding the BLM's authority to conduct scientific
study on the remains went unaddressed by all the parties involved, includ-
ing the Fallon Paiute. According to the statute, institutions must attempt to
determine cultural affiliation "to the extent possible based on information
possessed by [the] museum or Federal agency." 98 NAGPRA states, fur-
thermore, that the inventory and determination process is not an authoriza-
tion to conduct further scientific study on the remains. 199 Notes from a
December 1994 staff meeting indicate that the BLM encouraged its re-
searchers to violate this moratorium by studying the remains extensively,
before any tribes claimed the Spirit Cave Man for repatriation. 200 These
notes also indicate that the BLM planned to tie study of the remains into an
unrelated, ongoing research program to stall the NAGPRA process.201 The
191. Id. at 1223.
192. Id. at 1224.
193. Id. at 1220.
194. Id at 1210-12.
195. Id. at 1220.
196. See id. at 1223-24.
197. See id.
198. 25 U.S.C. § 3003(a) (2006).
199. Id. § 3003(b)(2).
200. MAKAH INDIAN TRIBE & THE NAT'L ASS'N OF TRIBAL HISTORIC PRES. OFFICERS, supra note
170, at G-50.
201. Id.
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Fallon Paiute, however, did not allege these violations of NAGPRA at tri-
al.202
Years later, the Fallon Paiute may yet succeed in their claim for the
Spirit Cave Man. In contrast to the Kennewick Man, the Spirit Cave Man
does fall under the category of remains regulated by the March 2010 Regu-
lations: the Spirit Cave Man is Native American, but culturally unidentifia-
ble, and was previously housed in an institutional collection.203
If the Fallon Paiute tribe renews its request for the repatriation of the
remains, it will likely base its request upon an aboriginal connection to the
area where researchers discovered the Spirit Cave Man. The March 2010
Regulations define aboriginal land as that recognized by judgment of the
Indian Claims Commission, the U.S. Court of Claims, act of Congress,
treaty, or Executive Order.204 The Indian Claims Commission has pre-
viously determined that the area in which Spirit Cave is situated is abori-
ginal land of the Fallon Paiute. 205 The tribe, therefore, may claim the Spirit
Cave Man under the regulations as an "Indian tribe . .. that [is] recognized
as aboriginal to the area from which the human remains were removed." 206
Thus, assuming that the regulations are legitimate, the Fallon Paiute will
likely succeed in their claim.
Indeed, the March 2010 Regulations will allow many federally recog-
nized tribes to succeed in claims for CUNARs that they had failed in pre-
viously. Before the March 2010 Regulations came into effect, claimant
tribes could not succeed in their claim to CUJNARs without presenting new
evidence proving cultural affiliation to the claimed remains.207 This process
could repeat several times over the course of several years-the Fallon
Paiute's claim to the Spirit Cave Man is a good example. The March 2010
Regulations put an end to that process. Under the regulations, institutions
now look to where the remains were discovered and compare that data to
evidence of tribal or aboriginal occupation of the discovery site at the time
when the remains were discovered.208 This shift from a cultural affiliation
202. See generally Fallon Paiute-Shoshone, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1216-23.
203. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations-Disposition of
Culturally Unidentifiable Human Remains, 75 Fed. Reg. 12378, 12403 (Mar. 15, 2010) (to be codified
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10.11).
204. Id.
205. PAT BARKER, CYNTHIA ELLIS & STEPHANIE DAMADIO, DETERMINATION OF CULTURAL
AFFILIATION OF HUMAN REMAINS FROM SPIRIT CAVE, NEVADA 46 (2000).
206. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations-Disposition of Cultu-
rally Unidentifiable Human Remains, 75 Fed. Reg. at 12404.
207. See 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (2006).
208. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations-Disposition of Cultu-
rally Unidentifiable Human Remains, 75 Fed. Reg. at 12389, 12404.
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to geographic affiliation standard will likely make it easier for tribes to
demonstrate a valid connection to a claimed set of remains.
IV. LEGITIMACY OF THE REGULATIONS REGARDING CULTURALLY
UNIDENTIFIABLE REMAINS
As noted earlier, the March 2010 Regulations mandate the repatriation
of CUNARS to claimant tribes based on their geographic connection to the
region in which the remains were discovered. The regulations govern all
culturally unidentifiable human remains previously housed in an institution
and previously determined to be Native American.209 Within ninety days of
receiving a repatriation request, and before any transfer of custody is made,
the regulations require institutions to consult with claimant tribes upon
whose tribal or aboriginal land the remains were discovered. 210 If, after
consulting with all of the tribes, no cultural affiliation is determined, and
the institution cannot prove a right of possession,211 then the institution
must offer to transfer control of the remains, first, to the tribe upon whose
tribal land the remains were discovered, and second, to the tribe upon
whose aboriginal land the remains were discovered. 212 This duty is non-
discretionary. 213
If valid, the regulations will result in the repatriation of a number of
the 125,000 CUNARs currently housed in institutional collections.214 Pro-
ponents of the regulations see them as the next step in fully implementing
NAGPRA. 215 Opponents, fearing their effect on archaeology, anthropolo-
gy, and other related disciplines, claim that they are beyond The Secre-
tary's power to regulate. 216
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. Right of possession is defined as "possession obtained with the voluntary consent of an indi-
vidual or group that had authority of alienation." 43 C.F.R. § 10.10(a)(2) (2009). As others have pointed
out, it is highly unlikely that any institution would be able to prove that it obtained voluntary consent
from an authoritative individual or group to obtain culturally unidentifiable remains. Letter from Dennis
O'Rourke, Patricia M. Lambert, Clark S. Larsen & Fred H. Smith, Am. Ass'n of Physical Anthropolo-
gists, to Dr. Sherry Hutt, Manager, Nat'l NAGPRA Program 4 (May. 10, 2010), www.regulations.gov
(enter Keyword or ID: DOI-2007-0032-0164.1).
212. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations-Disposition of Cultu-
rally Unidentifiable Human Remains, 75 Fed. Reg. at 12404.
213. Id.
214. See Letter from NAGPRA Review Comm., supra note 17, at 1.
215. See, e.g., id at 1-6.
216. See Letter from John W. McCarter, Jr., supra note 16, at 1-3.
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A. General Rulemaking Authority
Motivated in part by scientific interest in CUNARs such as the Spirit
Cave Man, critics of the March 2010 regulations have questioned their
legitimacy. They argue that because NAGPRA does not explicitly author-
ize The Secretary to regulate CUNARs in institutional holdings, he lacks
the administrative authority to promulgate regulations regarding these re-
mains. 217
Contrary to critical assertions, The Secretary likely has the general
rulemaking authority necessary to promulgate these regulations. Whether
Congress delegated rulemaking authority to an agency is a matter of statu-
tory interpretation. 218 If the meaning of the statute is apparent from a plain
reading of the text, then that interpretation must control, unless it leads to
an absurd result.219 Section 3011 of the statute states that "[t]he Secretary
shall promulgate regulations to carry out this chapter within 12 months of
November 16, 1990."220 A plain reading of this text indicates that Congress
explicitly granted general rulemaking authority to The Secretary. Section
3006(c)(7) of the statute supports this interpretation indirectly, as it states
that the NAGPRA Review Committee shall "consult[] with the Secretary in
the development of regulations to carry out" NAGPRA. 221
This interpretation does not run afoul of recent Supreme Court case
law, which instructs not to imply broad congressional delegations of agen-
cy authority from delegations of authority on specific issues.222 The Secre-
tary's regulation of CUNARs is unlike that of the Attorney General's
attempted regulation of the medical profession in Gonzales v. Oregon.223
There, the Court affirmed a Ninth Circuit decision to strike down an inter-
pretive rule promulgated by the Attorney General of the United States un-
der the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). 224 The Attorney General had
attempted to criminalize the practice of prescribing controlled substances to
assist the suicide of terminally ill patients in Oregon, even though Oregon
law permitted this practice. 225 In determining whether the Attorney General
had authority to do this, the Court looked to the regulatory power granted
217. Id.
218. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258-59 (2006).
219. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006); Gonzales,
546 U.S. at 258-59.
220. 25 U.S.C. § 3011 (2006).
221. Id. § 3006(c)(7).
222. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257-58.
223. See id at 253-54.
224. Id. at 249, 255, 275.
225. Id. at 253-54.
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to him under the CSA. 226 The CSA allowed the Attorney General to prom-
ulgate regulations necessary to carry out his duties in adding new drugs to
the schedule of controlled substances, and registering and deregistering
physicians who are authorized to prescribe controlled substances to pa-
tients.227
The government argued that the Attorney General's power to deregis-
ter physicians for acts inconsistent with the public interest gave him the
power to criminalize certain medical practices. 228 The Court, however,
rejected that argument. 229 It reasoned that the CSA's highly-structured
delegation of authority for the purpose of registering and deregistering
physicians did not grant the Attorney General an implicit and greater power
to criminalize certain medical practices. 230
Here, The Secretary has not strayed from his grant of regulatory au-
thority. Sections 3011 and 3006(c)(7) indicate that Congress intended to
give The Secretary broad rulemaking authority. 231 Moreover, although
Congress provided some specification for how to regulate certain issues in
sections 3002(b), 3006(g), and 3007(b), NAGPRA does not contain a high-
ly specific procedure for promulgating regulations for any issue, unlike the
CSA. 232 This unconstrained mandate to promulgate regulations indicates
that The Secretary has general rulemaking authority under NAGPRA.
B. Deference to The Secretary's Interpretation
1. Congressional Intent
After establishing general rulemaking authority, the test created in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. governs
the legitimacy of an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it
administers. 233 The Secretary's regulation of CUNARs is valid, therefore,
if Congress has not directly spoken to the breadth of his authority over
these remains, 234 and if his interpretation of the statute is reasonable. 235
Determining whether Congress has spoken directly to an issue involves
226. Id. at 258-62.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 262-63.
229. Id.
230. Id at 260-61.
231. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3006(c)(7), 3011 (2006).
232. See id. §§ 3002(b), 3006(g), 3007(b).
233. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
234. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 845.
235. Id. at 843.
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analysis of the text of the statute itself, examination of other statutes deal-
ing with the same issue, and common sense about "the manner in which
Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision ... to an administrative
agency." 236
Turning to the first prong of the test, the text of the statute indicates
that Congress has not spoken directly on the issue of The Secretary's power
to regulate CUNARs housed in institutions.237 Congress speaks most close-
ly to this issue in 25 U.S.C. § 3006(c)(5), which charges the NAGPRA
Review Committee with "compiling an inventory of culturally unidentifia-
ble human remains that are in the possession or control of each Federal
agency and museum and recommending specific actions for developing a
process for disposition of such remains." 238 This delegation of authority
does not mean that Congress intended to prevent The Secretary from regu-
lating CUNARs. Nothing in the text of the statute prohibits The Secretary
from acting on the recommendations of the Review Committee regarding
these remains. NAGPRA, instead, instructs the NAGPRA Review Commit-
tee to collaborate with The Secretary in promulgating regulations.239 There-
fore, the presence of this language suggests that Congress intended The
Secretary to regulate CUNARs.
Examination of other statutes dealing with Native American remains
indicates that Congress has previously invested The Secretary with the kind
of authority necessary to regulate CUNARs. As one commentator noted, in
ARPA, Congress gave The Secretary power to regulate the "ultimate dispo-
sition" of archaeological resources, 240 defined as "any material remains of
past human life or activities which are of archaeological interest," including
human remains. 241 Additionally, in the past, Congress has invested The
Secretary, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, with the authority to man-
age many aspects of Native American life, from the creation and mainten-
ance of tribal government, to the management of natural resources on
Native American reservations. 242 These delegations of power suggest that
236. Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
237. See 25 U.S.C. § 3006 (2006).
238. Id. § 3006(c)(5).
239. Id. § 3006(c)(7).
240. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 9179, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470dd(l)-(2) (2006); see
Letter from Marc D. Slonim, Brian W. Chestnut & Rebecca N. Johnson, Ziontz, Chestnut, Varnell,
Berley & Slonim, to Dr. Sherry Hutt, Manager, Nat'l NAGPRA Program 26-27 (Jan. 14, 2008),
http://www.regulations.gov (enter Keyword or ID: DOI-2007-0032-0066. 1).
241. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1).
242. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) ("The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direc-
tion of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe,
have the management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian relations."); Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, id. § 458aa ("The Secretary of the Inte-
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if Congress has spoken to The Secretary's authority to regulate CUNARs
under NAGPRA, it has affirmed his authority over them.243
Common sense also suggests that, if Congress has spoken, it has af-
firmed The Secretary's regulatory power over CUNARs. NAGPRA is leg-
islation intended to facilitate the repatriation of Native American remains
to Native Americans. 244 As other commentators have pointed out, Congress
would not prevent The Secretary from regulating the kinds of remains that
it enacted NAGPRA to protect. 245
Lastly, The Secretary's assertion of jurisdiction over CUNARs is ap-
propriate even in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Food and Drug
Administration v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp.246 There, the Su-
preme Court expressed doubt as to whether an agency interpretation of its
jurisdictional limits deserved Chevron deference.247 The FDA had at-
tempted to regulate tobacco products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), claiming that they were a health risk.248 In rejecting the
FDA's interpretation of its jurisdictional limits, the Court noted that Con-
gress had spoken on the issue of tobacco products. 249 Congress had already
passed entirely separate regulatory schemes for tobacco products, such as
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and also dealt with the
issue of cigarettes and health under such statutes as the Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act; the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act; and the
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization
Act.250 In addition, the legislative history of the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act and the FDCA indicated that Congress had contem-
plated giving the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products under that statute
but rejected the proposal.251 As a result, the Court concluded, FDA juris-
diction over tobacco products would be contrary to Congress's plainly ma-
nifested view of the issue.252
rior ... shall establish and carry out a program ... to be known as Tribal Self-Governance .... ")
Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, id. § 2102(a) (2006) ("Any Indian tribe, subject to the ap-
proval of the Secretary [of the Interior] ... may enter into any joint venture ... providing for the explo-
ration for, or extraction, processing, or other development of, oil, gas, uranium . . . .").
243. See Letter from Marc D. Slonim, Brian W. Chestnut & Rebecca N. Johnson, Ziontz, supra
note 240, at 26-27.
244. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. E3484-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (remarks by Rep. Morris K.
Udall).
245. Letter from Ziontz, Chestnut, Varnell, Berley and Slonim, supra note 240, at 27.
246. 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 126-30.
249. Id. at 132-33.
250. Id. at 144-55.
251. Id. at 147-48.
252. Id. at 160-61.
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Here, however, Congress has not spoken directly on the issue of The
Secretary's authority over CUNARs housed in institutions. NAGPRA spe-
cifically provides that the NAGPRA Review Committee shall make rec-
ommendations for the disposition of these remains but nothing prevents
The Secretary from acting upon these recommendations. 253 The 2010 regu-
lations, therefore, do not contradict any express Congressional intent, un-
like the regulations at issue in Williamson.254
2. Reasonableness of The Secretary's Interpretation
After determining that Congress has not spoken on the issue, the next
question is whether The Secretary reasonably interpreted the statute to
grant him authority to regulate CUNARs in institutional holdings.255 Gen-
erally, an interpretation of the statute that is consistent with the plain mean-
ing of its text and with its underlying purpose deserves Chevron
deference. 256
The Secretary's interpretation of his jurisdiction under NAGPRA is
consistent with the plain meaning of the statute and its underlying purpose.
The text of the statute itself suggests that The Secretary has authority over
these remains. As noted by one commentator, section 3002(b) invests The
Secretary with the authority to promulgate regulations over unclaimed cul-
tural items discovered on federal or tribal land after NAGPRA's enact-
ment.257 This is important because the statutorily defined term "cultural
items" includes all human remains, even culturally unidentifiable ones. In
this context, NAGPRA explicitly gives The Secretary authority over CU-
NARs. Interpreting NAGPRA to give The Secretary authority over CU-
NARs in institutional holdings does not contradict section 3002(b) or any
other section of NAGPRA. 258
253. See 25 U.S.C. § 3006(c)(5) (2006).
254. See Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.
255. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
256. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2002); Nat'l R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407,417 (1992).
257. Robert Van Horn, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act at the Mar-
gins: Does NAGPRA Govern the Disposition ofAncient, Culturally Unidentified Human Remains?, 15
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & Soc. JUST. 227, 250 (2008).
258. Congressional mandates to promulgate regulations regarding specific issues in sections
3002(b), 3006(g), and 3007(b) of NAGPRA do not indicate that The Secretary's interpretation of the
statute is improper. Indeed, the very framework of Chevron anticipates that Congress may grant an
agency general rulemaking authority, while explicitly delegating control over certain issues, and impli-
citly delegating control over others. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
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C. The Reasonableness of the Geographic Standard
Critics of the March 2010 Regulations also argue that, even if The
Secretary has authority to promulgate the regulations, the regulations are
nonetheless invalid. Specifically, they argue that the geographic standard of
affiliation introduced by the regulations is inconsistent with NAGPRA's
statutory scheme, and that the regulations violate the statute's balance of
interests between scientific study and repatriation. 259
Nonetheless, the geographic standard of affiliation employed by the
March 2010 Regulations is likely consistent with NAGPRA. The regula-
tions require institutions to transfer control over CUNARs to claimant tri-
bes, first, to the claimant tribe "from whose tribal land, at the time of the
excavation or removal, the human remains were removed" and, second, to
the claimant tribe "recognized as aboriginal to the area from which the
human remains were removed." 260 This language mirrors that in section
3002(a)(2)(C) of NAGPRA, which provides that Native American remains
discovered or excavated on tribal land or aboriginal land after enactment of
NAGPRA may be repatriated to the tribe upon whose land the remains
were discovered.261 NAGPRA does not require proof of cultural affiliation
in that situation. 262 Rather, NAGPRA permits an inference of cultural affil-
iation between remains of this kind and a claimant tribe based upon their
geographic connection. 263 Consequently, the March 2010 regulations are
consistent with NAGPRA: in fact, the regulatory language is nearly iden-
tical to the language of section 3002(a)(2)(C).
Moreover, the regulations do not upset the balance of interests in
NAGPRA between scientific study and repatriation and are therefore not
contrary to the intent of the statute. NAGPRA strongly favors Native
American interests over Native American remains.264 When discovered on
tribal, aboriginal, or federal land after NAGPRA's enactment, NAGPRA
mandates repatriation to claimants. 265 And where cultural affiliation to
human remains is determinable, the regulations mandate repatriation of
them except where an ongoing study of national importance exists.266
259. Letter from Soc'y for Am. Archaeology, to Dep't of the Interior 3 (Jan. 14, 2008),
http://www.regulations.gov (enter Keyword or ID: DOI-2007-0032-0039.2).
260. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations-Disposition of Cultu-
rally Unidentifiable Human Remains, 75 Fed. Reg. 12378, 12404 (Mar. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 10.11).
261. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(C) (2006).
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id. §§ 3002(a)-(b), 3003(a), 3005(b).
265. Id. § 3002(a).
266. Id. §§ 3005(a)-(b).
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Therefore, although these regulations will, as opponents point out, likely
remove a large number of human remains from institutional collections and
prevent study of them, this result is not necessarily contrary to the purpose
of the Act or its balance of interests.267 Congress enacted NAGPRA to
right past wrongs against Native Americans and protect Native American
burial sites from desecration. 268 The regulations further that purpose by
expanding the repatriation of Native American remains to Native Ameri-
cans.
This reading of the statute is supported by section 3003(b)(2) of
NAGPRA, which states, in part, that "this chapter shall not be construed to
be an authorization for, the initiation of new scientific studies of [Native
American remains in institutional collections] and associated funerary ob-
jects or other means of acquiring or preserving additional scientific infor-
mation from such remains and objects." 269 The above language suggests
that Congress did not intend for researchers to conduct extensive study on
CUNARs in institutional collections. The March 2010 regulations, there-
fore, do not upset the alleged balance of interests between scientific study
and repatriation regarding these remains-NAGPRA does not countenance
scientific study of them.
CONCLUSION
The March 2010 regulations regarding CUNARs are likely a legiti-
mate exercise of agency authority under NAGPRA. Congress granted The
Secretary general rulemaking authority to promulgate regulations and the
March 2010 regulations are reasonable under the Chevron test.
NAGPRA is human rights legislation aimed at redressing past wrongs
committed against Native Americans and the remains of their ancestors. 270
For many years, common law and statutory law, both state and federal,
were ineffective in protecting Native American graves and human remains
from desecration. 271 Rather, the scientific community was allowed to treat
Native Americans remains as resources to study in the pursuit of know-
ledge.272 Congress enacted NAGPRA to change that by providing Native
267. Contra Letter from John W. McCarter, Jr., supra note 16, at 7-8.
268. See S. REP. No. 101-473, at 1-2 (1990).
269. 25 U.S.C. § 3003(b)(2).
270. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. E3484-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (remarks by Rep. Morris K.
Udall).
271. See, e.g., Wana the Bear v. Comm. Constr., Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423, 426-27 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982).
272. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 44, at 40.
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Americans with the legal right to request repatriation of ancestral remains
from the holdings of agencies and institutions. 273
Scientific research and public education are valid goals whose legiti-
macy is not in question. NAGPRA appropriately exempts Native American
remains from repatriation when a scientific study of national importance is
ongoing with the remains. 274
Nonetheless, a commitment to NAGPRA entails a commitment to giv-
ing up control275 over Native American remains. 276 The regulation and
repatriation of CUNARs is in keeping with the spirit of the law.
273. See 136 CONG. REC. E3484-01.
274. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(b).
275. There are a number of examples of scientific researchers working with Native American
communities to achieve both the goals of scientific study and the interests of Native American com-
munities in treating their ancestors with respect. For example, a dispute between the Fallon Paiute-
Shoshone of Nevada and a state museum resulted in the repatriation of human remains to the tribe. The
tribe interred the remains on their reservation. However, they interred the remains in a specially de-
signed crypt that, on occasion, could be opened. This design gave researchers the continued opportunity
to study the remains. S. REP. No. 101-473, at 5 (1990).
276. See 136 CONG. REC. E3484-01.
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